This year (2015) marks the 21st formal anniversary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in December a new climate treaty is expected to be reached. Yet, the UNFCCC has not been successful in setting the world on a path to meet the 2 degree target 1 . Meanwhile, other forums, such as the G20 and subnational forums, have increasingly become sites of climate change initiatives [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . There has, however, to date been no systematic evaluation of what forums climate change policy-makers and practitioners perceive to be needed in order to effectively tackle climate change. Drawing on survey data from two recent UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), we show that there exists an overall preference for state-led, multilateral forums. However, preferences starkly diverge between respondents from different geographical regions and no clear contender to the UNFCCC emerges. Our results highlight difficulties in coordinating global climate policy in a highly fragmented governance landscape.
. Critics of the current multilateral approach argue that it is too cumbersome, as the decision-making process of the UNFCCC relies on finding consensus among its 195 parties [10] [11] . David Victor 11 , for example, has argued that since only a dozen countries emit the majority of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, a club like the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) would present a good candidate for making progress on climate change. Others, however, maintain that minilateral clubs like the MEF, G8, and the Asia-Pacific Partnership are not necessarily more effective than the UNFCCC, lack the legitimacy of the UN climate process 6 , and do not primarily focus on significantly increasing mitigation ambition 5 .
A related discussion concerns the architecture of climate change governance. Thus far the main efforts to respond to climate change have been state-led, focusing on building a universal regime through a legally binding multilateral agreement in a so-called top-down approach. Proponents of this architecture maintain that a strong, centralized regime is necessary for ensuring effective and fair outcomes [12] [13] . Critics, however, argue that a bottom-up approach, favoring more national and nonstate initiatives, would provide a more effective response [14] [15] [16] . A range of sub-national and transnational initiatives, such as the C40 network of major cities and the Carbon Disclosure Project, have shown that other actors can take ambitious steps when national governments resist strong targets and timetables 3 . This, however, increases the fragmentation of climate change governance 17 .
Fragmented institutions, in turn, complicate policy coordination 18 and raise questions about the legitimacy and effectiveness of hybrid governance arrangements 19 . The pledge-and-review system emerging since the Copenhagen Accord has moved climate governance towards a bottom-up approach, with implications for the catalytic role of the UNFCCC 13 .
A pertinent question is whether there are other forums than the UNFCCC that could effectively tackle climate change? This study presents results from 922 valid responses from the International Negotiations Survey distributed to participants at two consecutive UNFCCC COPs (2013 and 2014). The question analyzed reads: "What other forums outside the UNFCCC are, in your view, important for effectively tackling climate change?" (see Methods for details). This data is presented to examine how a range of climate change policy-makers and practitioners perceive the importance of forums outside the UNFCCC in terms of scales (Table 1) , issue-areas (Table 2 ) and whether the forums are led by governments or other actors (Supplementary Table 1 ). These results are compared across six world geographical regions and between governmental and non-governmental (NGO) respondents.
The data show a wide spread in responses, with forums spanning from the global to local levels. The G20 (14%), the MEF (5%), the UN Convention on Biological diversity (5%) and the Montreal Protocol (4%) were the four most frequently mentioned individual forums. The low figures suggest that climate change policy-makers and practitioners do not see any given alternative to the UNFCCC. Instead survey respondents state a wide range of institutions and initiatives, such as climate clubs, transnational governance initiatives, public-private partnerships and other alternative climate governance instruments, in line with the fragmented picture of climate governance as portrayed in the literature 2, 17, 20 . The breadth of answers shows that there exists no lack of innovation in governance arrangements to respond to climate change, albeit with low agreement among policy-makers and practitioners on which of these are important for effectively tackling climate change.
Overall, both governmental and NGO respondents identify other multilateral forums (defined here as international organizations with near universal membership) as important for tackling climate change, over minilateral forums (defined here as groupings with select state membership) and forums organized at lower administrative levels ( Table 1 ). The preferences for multilateralism in general and UN-led multilateralism in particular were strongest among government representatives. These preferences were relatively even across geographical regions, with respondents from South and Latin America (S&L America) standing out for expressing the strongest preferences for multilateral, UN-led forums (66%).
The preferences for minilateral forums varied more significantly amongst government representatives across geographical regions. Those from Europe and North America express surprisingly strong preferences for minilateral forums -about two thirds of the government respondents from these regions. This indicates a large potential for such forums in these regions. In contrast, the preferences for minilateralism are very weak among government representatives from the other four regions. This finding is expected given the weak role of most of these countries in such minilateral fora, reflecting political power imbalances in such governance arrangements. For example, while several Asian countries have participated in prominent minilateral forums, such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, these tend to be initiated and driven by other states 21 .
Interestingly, government representatives' preferences for bilateral (2 to 5%), national (5 to 13%) and most notably local (1 to 10%) forums increased dramatically from COP-19 to COP-20. Moreover, the preferences for regional, minilateral and IGO-led forums remained stable while the data suggest a drop in the preferences for UN-led forums (52 to 40%). Consequently, the data suggests a shift in preferences from the multilateral governance level towards lower administrative levels rather than to governance forums with a more select state membership.
Overall, NGOs identified national and local forums to a larger extent than government respondents, indicating support for bottom-up approaches (Supplementary Information). Our data suggest relatively stable NGO preferences over time, with the exception of a growing support for minilateral forums from COP-19 to COP-20 (16 to 22%).
The data were also categorized according to the forum's primary issue-area. This sheds light on the extent to which respondents view that effective responses to climate change will require action in other topical areas. Besides climate forums, government representatives indicate preferences for economic and environmental forums ( Table 2 ).
Significant differences in the responses on issue-areas are found across geographical regions. The preferences of North American government representatives are stronger for climate (MEF and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition), environment (specifically atmosphere forums, i.e. Montreal protocol) and economic (G20) forums, while preferences for social forums are very low. The preferences of European government representatives are significantly stronger for economic forums (predominantly the OECD) and slightly lower for environmental forums. The preferences of S&L American government representatives are stronger for climate and social forums (Indigenous peoples forums) and weaker for economic forums. The preferences of Oceanian government representatives are weaker for climate and economic forums but stronger for general forums (notably the Pacific Islands Forum) and atmosphere forums. African and Asian government representatives' views were more similar to the world averages, with the exception that African government representatives' preferences for economic forums were significantly weaker and those for biodiversity forums (UN Convention on Biological Diversity) stronger.
Comparing tables 1 and 2 shows that preferences for minilateral forums noticeably overlap with preferences for economic forums, highlighting the concern that minilateral approaches risk limiting not only membership but also the issues under discussion 6, 8, 22 .
Supplementary Table 1 examines whether the identified forums are led by states, IGOs, non-state actors or hybrid arrangements (mix of state and non-state actors). Government representatives clearly view other state-led and IGO-led forums outside the UNFCCC as important for effectively tackling climate change. This is most pronounced among North American and European government representatives. In contrast, S&L American and Asian government representatives indicate weaker preferences for state-led forums. The preferences for state-led forums were unchanged between the years while the preferences for IGO-led forums weakened (54 to 34%). Interestingly, government representatives across all six geographical regions indicate weak preferences for both non-state-led (19%) and hybrid (14%) forums, but the data suggest strengthened preferences for non-state-led forums from 15% at COP-19 to 21% at COP-20. This indicates a low, but growing, recognition for nonstate initiatives by state actors. The pattern of identifying state rather than hybrid or non-state forums is unexpectedly most marked among government representatives from North America and Europe. This is puzzling given the often high level of government support for non-state initiatives in these regions.
Unsurprisingly, NGO respondents overall mention non-state forums more often than government representatives. NGO representatives' preferences for non-state-led forums however diverge substantially across geographical regions, which may reflect the uneven pattern of non-state initiatives currently underway 3 .
We have established that there exists little agreement on which other forums outside the UNFCCC are important for effectively tackling climate change. Moreover, the generally strong support for state-led, multilateral, climate forums among our survey respondents mirrors the UNFCCC's structure in terms of scale, issue-area and actor type. Yet, the multitude of responses indicating other forums as important shows that the UNFCCC is no longer the only show in town.
Notably, our study demonstrates strong preferences among climate change policy-makers for minilateral forums in two out of six world regions, harboring around 40% of world greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, there is a large potential for pursuing climate change in minilateral forums dealing with climate change and economic issues in North America and Europe. Even in these regions, however, the results show differences in which types of organizations are deemed most important, with North American respondents highlighting the MEF, and European respondents frequently citing the OECD. Such minilateral forums are not acknowledged by policy-makers in the other four regions, however. Minilateral forums in their current form are therefore unlikely to deliver legitimate global solutions to climate change.
To the extent that we can see trends in our data, government support for minilateral forums has remained stable over the two years measured. Instead, governments appear to express stronger (although still relatively weak) preferences for bilateral, national and local forums and express a growing recognition for non-state initiatives. This could be a reflection of recent developments, with the bilateral US-China climate agreement announced in November 2014 and the growing visibility of non-state initiatives (e.g. those highlighted by the UNFCCC's NAZCA portal 23 ).
The breadth of answers to our survey question map out a highly complex and fragmented climate governance landscape, presenting both opportunities and risks. The potential advantages of the current architecture include the facilitation of learning and building of trust through an increase in interactions between different actors and initiatives 14 . The risk is normative contestation between different governance arrangements that foster competition over cooperation and that risk undermining the work of the UNFCCC 21 . The launch of the NAZCA portal at COP-20 and other efforts to highlight international cooperative initiatives 24 indicate that the UNFCCC is attempting to take on an umbrella role to provide a framework for coordinating actions in the currently highly fragmented climate governance landscape. Establishing portals alone will, however, not ensure synergies. Future research should therefore focus on how to best combine top-down and bottom-up processes to spur innovative climate policies. Achieving effective coordination of diverse climate initiatives is likely to be a key challenge for the UNFCCC as it is entering its third decade.
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Roughly 40% of the 922 valid responses were from governmental (366) and 60% were from nongovernmental (556) representatives, our sample under-represents governmental respondents in comparison to the composition of the frame population in COP-19 and COP-20, comprising approximately 47% governmental, 53% nongovernmental [34] [35] . The sample contains less media and intergovernmental representatives than the frame population. In terms of geographical representation (UNFCCC Secretariat unpublished data), the sample overall corresponds well with participation from the six world regions; with a slight over-representation to African Group and Latin American government delegates in comparison to delegates from European and North American countries. Percentages are available from the corresponding author upon request.
The question that is analyzed here reads: "What other forums outside the UNFCCC are, in your view, important for effectively tackling climate change? Please provide examples:". Respondents were asked to indicate in free text which forum or forums they believed to be important for tackling climate change.
Since the UNFCCC is a node for intergovernmental collaboration on climate change and attracts actors that work with climate change issues at different levels [34] [35] [36] , our sample captures expert views on other forums and provides a starting point for exploring preferences for involving other institutions beyond the UNFCCC to a greater extent in climate change governance. However, given that our survey respondents are participants of a UNFCCC COP, a strong bias in favor of other UNforums in the responses is expected. 
Non-governmental (NGO) respondents' perceptions of other forums
In terms of scale (Table 1) , NGO representatives expressed relatively stable preferences across world geographical regions for multilateral, UN-led forums and more variability in the preferences for minilateral forums. This pattern was more pronounced among European and Oceanian NGO representatives and weaker among African and South and Latin American NGO representatives.
In terms of issue-areas (Table 2) , NGO representatives indicate stronger preferences for social forums and weaker for environmental ones than government representatives and growing preferences for economic forums from COP-19 to COP-20.
In terms of whether the identified forums are led by states, IGOs, non-state actors or hybrid arrangements (mix of state and non-state actors), unsurprisingly, NGO respondents overall mention non-state-led forums more often than government representatives (Supplementary Table 1 ). While they do so twice as frequently as the government representatives, this results in equally strong overall preferences for state-and non-state-led forums (40%) and stronger than those for both IGO-led and hybrid forums. This is valid for African, Asian, European and North American NGO representatives. Preferences for state-led forums are stronger among Oceanian NGO representatives and weaker among South and Latin American NGO representatives. The latter express preferences for more direct involvement of people to take climate action. NGO representatives' preferences for non-state-led forums diverge substantially across geographical regions. North and South and Latin American NGO representatives' preferences for non-state-led forums are stronger and those expressed by African and Asian ones weaker. This may reflect the uneven pattern of non-state initiatives currently underway 3 .
